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ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM: CHALLENGES OF 
INTEGRATING CHINA INTO THE WTO 
SYSTEM 
Henry Gao
 
ABSTRACT 
Since China’s accession to the WTO in late 2001, one of the most 
intriguing questions for trade analysts has been whether the “new 
kid on the block” would seek to disrupt the status quo in the WTO 
upon its entry. This paper answers the question by reviewing China’s 
participation in two key activities of the WTO, i.e., trade 
negotiations and dispute settlement, as well as another important 
component of global trade governance: regional trade agreements 
(RTAs). Drawing from an in-depth study of China’s record in these 
activities, the author argues that, overall, China has transformed 
from a passive “taker” of the existing rules to a country that will 
“shake” the rules for its own interests or even “make” new rules, 
albeit at uneven paces in different areas. The paper analyzes the 
reasons for China’s varying behavioral patterns in the three areas, 
and concludes by exploring China’s future role in the WTO, as well 
as the potential ramifications of China’s ascent in global trade 
governance. 
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I. INTRODUCTION1 
In an article published in 2008, Dr. Zhang Xiangchen, then 
Director-General of the Department of WTO Affairs of the Ministry of 
Commerce of the People's Republic of China (MOFCOM) and current 
Deputy Permanent Representative of China‘s WTO Mission, told the 
following story: ―There is an English idiom: elephant in the room. A person 
keeps an elephant in his living room. While his visitors feel very strange 
about this, they choose to pretend to ignore the elephant out of respect for 
the host.‖ 
As the editorial for the July 2008 issue of China WTO Tribune—a 
monthly journal on trade policy officially sponsored by MOFCOM, Dr. 
Zhang‘s article was apparently not meant to entertain zoologists who study 
large mammals. Instead, he was referring to one of the most intriguing 
questions for trade analysts since China‘s accession to the WTO in late 
2001: how would China behave once it became a formal member of the 
multilateral trading system? The question is two-fold. First, will China 
faithfully implement its WTO accession commitments? Second, will China 
seek to upset the existing power structure in the WTO? 
As the author will demonstrate later in the article, the two questions are 
not entirely unrelated as the domestic implementation of commitments can 
well influence China‘s behavior in the WTO. So far, however, the first 
question has received the most attention from observers. In addition to 
abundant media coverage, official statements, and academic commentaries, 
the concern is well illustrated by the following passages from the Working 
Party Report of China‘s WTO Accession:
2
 
Some members of the Working Party indicated that because of 
the significant size, rapid growth and transitional nature of the 
Chinese economy, a pragmatic approach should be taken in 
determining China's need for recourse to transitional periods and 
other special provisions in the WTO Agreement available to 
developing country WTO Members. Each agreement and China's 
situation should be carefully considered and specifically 
                                                        
1 Some of the initial findings in this paper were presented at the 2010 Annual Meeting of the 
American Society of International Law held in Washington, D.C. in March 2010, and the 
Conference on Trade Remedy, Financial Crisis and the Challenge to the WTO held in Taipei in 
October 2010. The author wishes to thank the participants at the two conferences for their most 
helpful comments. In particular, the author wishes to thank Prof. Chang-fa Lo, Carolyn Deere, 
Samantha Derksen, as well as the anonymous reviewer and the editorial staff of the journal for 
their most helpful comments. This paper is completed in August 2010 and all the cases and other 
information are up to date until then. All errors remain the author‘s own. 
2 WTO Ministerial Conference, Nov. 9-13. 2001, Doha, Report of the Working Party on the 
Accession of China, ¶ 9, WT/MIN(01)/3 (Nov. 10, 2001) [hereinafter China Accession Report]. 
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addressed. In this regard it was stressed that this pragmatic 
approach would be tailored to fit the specific cases of China's 
accession in a few areas, which were reflected in the relevant 
provisions set forth in China's Draft Protocol and Working Party 
Report. Noting the preceding statements, Members reiterated that 
all commitments taken by China in her accession process were 
solely those of China and would prejudice neither existing rights 
and obligations of Members under the WTO Agreement nor 
on-going and future WTO negotiations and any other process of 
accession . . . . (emphasis added) 
As a precaution against potential problems post-accession, the 
accession package includes many special rules tailor-made for China. 
These include substantive obligations such as the grant of national 
treatment to foreign persons and firms as well as foreign products (while 
the normal WTO national treatment obligation applies to products only),
3
 
and also the commitment to treat subsidies provided to state-owned 
enterprises as specific subsidies (which otherwise would not be deemed 
illegal under the normal WTO rules on subsidies).
4
 There are also 
procedural obligations, such as the establishment of a Transitional Review 
Mechanism for China in addition to the normal Trade Policy Review cycle 
for WTO Members,
5
 and the requirement to translate all foreign trade laws 
and regulations into one of the official languages of the WTO beyond the 
normal WTO transparency requirement.
6
 
Moreover, concerns that China might fall short of its WTO obligations 
have been shared not only among WTO Memberships as a whole but have 
been a particular concern for the most powerful player in the WTO: the 
United States. For example, in the U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000,
7
 
which was enacted by the U.S. government to grant China Permanent 
Normal Trade Relationship (PNTR) ahead of China‘s accession to the 
WTO, the U.S. noted the following: 
The record of the People's Republic of China in implementing 
trade-related commitments has been mixed. While the People's 
Republic of China has generally met the requirements of the 
1992 market access memorandum of understanding and the 1992 
and 1995 agreements on intellectual property rights protection, 
                                                        
3 World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the People‘s Republic of China, § 3, 
WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001). 
4 Id. § 10.2.  
5 Id. § 18.  
6 China Accession Report, supra note 2, ¶ 334.  
7 U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-286, 22 U.S.C. § 6901 (2000) [hereinafter U.S.– 
China Relations Act of 2000]. 
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other measures remain in place or have been put into place which 
tend to diminish the benefit to United States businesses, farmers, 
and workers from the People's Republic of China's 
implementation of those earlier commitments.
8
 
In light of these concerns, the U.S. government established a complex 
mechanism under the same Act to monitor ―compliance by China with its 
commitments under the WTO‖ involving the Departments of Commerce, 
State, and Agriculture as well as the United States Trade Representative 
(USTR).
9
 
In the view of the author, however, the second issue, while relatively 
neglected, is more important. At the end of the day, the first issue is only 
about the market access commitments made by a particular WTO Member. 
No matter how important the underlying commercial interests or the market 
of the Member might be, the implementation of such commitments is still 
unlikely to have a major impact on the institutional foundations of the 
multilateral trading system as a whole. In contrast, if China were to take an 
uncooperative approach in the WTO, this could well affect the smooth 
functioning or even viability of the multilateral trading system. Will China, 
a long-time outsider to the international system, be a ―good citizen‖ in the 
WTO, an institution that has evolved from a club-like group into an 
organization with great diversity and vast differences among its Members? 
Here again, the opinions are divided. In the lead up to China‘s accession, 
some commentators believed that China could weaken both the WTO 
dispute settlement system
10
 and the decision-making process,
11
 while 
others countered that, judging by China‘s relatively uneventful track-record 
in the UN and other international organizations that it has participated in, 
China‘s entry to the WTO would not be so disruptive to the status quo.
12
  
                                                        
8 Id. § 6901. 
9 See id. §§ 6943, 6951. 
10 For views that China‘s accession will over-burden the WTO dispute settlement system, see 
Sylvia Ostry, WTO Membership for China: To Be or Not to Be: Is That the Answer?, in CHINA AND 
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: ENTERING THE NEW MILLENNIUM 257, 263 (Deborah Z. Cass et al. 
eds., 2003); Sylvia Ostry, China and The WTO: The Transparency Issue, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & 
FOREIGN AFF. 1, 9 (1998). 
11 For views that China‘s accession will weaken the effectiveness of the WTO decision-making 
mechanism, see for example, Richard H. Steinberg, Institutional Implications of WTO Accession 
for China (U.C. Inst. on Global Conflict & Cooperation, IGCC Working Paper No. 41, 1999), 
available at http://igcc.ucsd.edu/pdf/policypapers/pp41.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). According 
to Steinberg, the unique political-economic system of China and the sheer size of its economy will 
cause ―political frictions‖ in the WTO upon its accession. However, due to its ineffective consensus 
decision-making process, it is unlikely that the WTO will be able to adopt new rules to deal with 
such problems. This will in turn further weaken the WTO decision-making mechanism. 
12 See generally Federick Abbott, China's Accession to the WTO, ASIL INSIGHT, Jan. 1998, 
available at http://www.asil.org/insigh13.cfm (last visited Feb. 27, 2011); James V. Feinerman, 
Chinese Participation in the International Legal Order: Rogue Elephant or Team Player?, 141 
CHINA Q. 186 (1995); see also Nicholas R. Lardy, China and the WTO, BROOKINGS POLICY BRIEF 
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As China enters its tenth year of WTO Membership, has the elephant 
really shaken the institutional foundations of the grand mansion at Centre 
William Rappard? This paper will answer the question by reviewing 
China‘s participation in two key activities of the WTO, i.e., trade 
negotiations and dispute settlement, as well as another important 
component of global trade governance: regional trade agreements (RTAs). I 
will argue that, overall, China has evolved from a passive ―taker‖ of the 
existing rules to a country that will ‗shake‘ the rules for its own interests or 
even ―make‖ new rules. At the same time, the pace of China‘s ascent has 
been uneven in different areas; the most aggressive strategy has been 
apparent in RTA negotiations, where China has been on a frantic shopping 
spree since its accession to the WTO. Similarly, while China was initially 
reluctant to use the multilateral dispute settlement system, it has become a 
major player since 2007. In terms of multilateral trade negotiations, China 
has been sending mixed signals: while it has made many submissions on 
negotiating issues in the Doha Round of WTO negotiations, China has so 
far successfully resisted calls from the U.S. and EU for it to play a leading 
role in the long-stalled trade talks. After exploring the reasons for varying 
behavioral patterns in a range of areas, the chapter concludes by exploring 
China‘s future role in the WTO, as well as the potential ramifications of 
China‘s ascent in global trade governance. 
II. MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 
As the world‘s third largest economy (in terms of nominal GDP)
13
 and 
trader,
14
 China has considerable economic clout. The growing economic 
muscle of China has been gradually translated into elevated standings in 
key international institutions. While China has been a permanent member 
of the UN Security Council ever since it resumed its UN membership in 
1971, it only recently gained more voting rights in both the IMF
15
 and 
World Bank.
16
 However, the transition seems to yet to happen at the WTO, 
                                                                                                                          
SERIES NO. 9 (Brookings Inst., Washington, D.C.), Nov. 1996, http://www.brookings.edu/papers/ 
1996/11globaleconomics_lardy.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2011); Nicholas R. Lardy, China's WTO 
Membership, BROOKINGS POLICY BRIEF SERIES NO. 47 (Brookings Inst., Washington, DC), Apr. 
1999, http://www.brookings.edu/papers/1999/04china_ lardy.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2011); 
NICHOLAS R. LARDY, INTEGRATING CHINA INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 155-57 (2002). Of course, 
as these international organizations have rather different objectives, functions and institutional 
structures than the WTO, the utility of such comparisons shall not be exaggerated. 
13  See The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2010, http://data.worldbank.org/ 
indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
14  WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, TRADE PROFILES 2009, at 38 (2009), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/trade_profiles09_e.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 
2011).  
15 IMF Reforms Give China More Power, BBC NEWS, Sept. 18, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
business/5358520.stm (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
16 China's Voting Power in World Bank Ascends to Third Place, XINHUA NEWS, Apr. 26, 2010, 
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where many key players keeps complaining about China‘s alleged 
―back-seat‖ role. Indeed, as recently as early 2008, both the U.S. and the 
European Union (EU) were still reportedly frustrated over China‘s passive 
approach to the Doha Round of negotiations and the WTO‘s management 
more broadly.
17
 Even senior Chinese officials openly acknowledge this. 
For example, in late 2006, Dr. Zhang Xiangchen conceded in an interview 
that China is only playing a ―preliminary constructive role‖.
18
 
While China has indeed taken a low-profile approach, this does not 
necessarily mean that China has made no contribution to the Doha Round. 
In fact, judging from the number of negotiating proposals submitted since 
the launch of the Round, China is one of the most active WTO Members in 
the negotiations. According to a study based on the official records of the 
WTO in 2003, China made a total of 29 written submissions to the Trade 
Negotiations Committee and its subsidiary bodies, the Ministerial 
Conference at Doha, and the working groups on the four Singapore issues. 
On this measure, China is the most active developing country participant 
and the fourth most active among all WTO Members in the Doha Round.
19
 
As of July 2008, China has submitted more than 100 proposals in the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA).
20
 These proposals are quite comprehensive 
and cover virtually all issues in the DDA, ranging from Agriculture and 
non-agricultural market access (NAMA) to Rules and Services. 
Given such active participation in the actual negotiation process, why 
then did China choose to take a low profile in public? In the author‘s view, 
the reasons include the following, elaborated in the forthcoming text. 
A. The Recently Acceded Member Argument 
Having been under the spotlight for 15 years in one of the longest 
                                                                                                                          
available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-04/26/c_13266890.htm (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2011). See also Press Release, The World Bank, World Bank Reforms Voting 
Power, Gets $86 Billion Boost (Apr. 25, 2010), available at http://go.worldbank.org/ 
WDRT2IZSE0 (last visited Feb. 16, 2011); World Bank, World Bank Group Voice Reform: 
Enhancing Voice and Participation in Developing and Transition Countries in 2010 and Beyond, 
DC 2010-0006/1 (Apr. 19, 2010), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEVCOMMIN 
T/Documentation/22553921/DC2010-006%28E%29Voice.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
17 Scott Otteman, Low-Key Chinese Role in Doha Trade Talks Frustrates U.S., EU, Jan. 2 INSIDE 
US-CHINA TRADE (2008). 
18 Shang Wu pu Shih Mao Tsu Chih Ssu Ssu Chang T`an Ju Chih: Ch`eng Chih Mao T`i Hsi I Fen 
Tzu (03) [Director-General of Department of WTO Affairs on China’s WTO Accession: Becoming 
Part of the WTO System, part 3], BEIJING YOUTH DAILY, Dec. 9, 2008, available at 
http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/70392/5146335.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2011). 
19 Håkan Nordström, Participation of Developing Countries in the WTO – New Evidence Based on 
the 2003 Official Records 28-30 (National Board of Trade, Sweden, 2002), available at 
http://www.noits.org/noits06/Final_Pap/Hakan_Nordstrom.pdf.  
20 Xiangchen Zhang, Wu Tzu Li Te Ta Hsiang [Elephant in the Room], 7 CHINA WTO TRIBUNE 
(2008), available at http://www.wtoguide.net/Html/jsy/061225111611339980871612532682519 
94.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
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accession negotiations
21
 in the history of the GATT/WTO, the first 
explanation for China‘s low profile in public in the DDA is that the Chinese 
government wanted some quiet breathing space to digest and implement its 
heavy accession commitments. Indeed, China‘s concessions on both trade 
in goods and services greatly exceed those of other WTO Members, most 
of which have not changed since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. As 
argued by Shi Miaomiao, Deputy Director-General of the Department of 
WTO Affairs of MOFCOM:
22
 
In terms of industrial products, if applying the Uruguay 
Round modality for tariff-reduction, China would only be 
required to reduce its tariff from a base point of 42.7% to the 
final bound tariff of 32.4% in year 2004, with an average 
reduction by 24.1%. According to its accession commitments, 
however, China‘s tariff reduction level is much greater. In 2004, 
China‘s average tariff rate on industrial products was reduced to 
9.5%. After China‘s fulfillment of its commitments on accession 
into WTO, it has reduced its tariff rate by as much as 78.9%, 
which is much bigger than the 33% tariff reduction commitment 
made by other countries during the Uruguay Round. Moreover, 
even if the new round of Doha negotiation concludes with a 
reduction rate of as much as 68.5%, the total tariff cut of China 
would still exceed the total tariff cut of other countries during the 
Uruguay Round and Doha Round combined. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . In terms of agriculture products, if applying the Uruguay 
Round modality for tariff-reduction, China would only be 
required to reduce its tariff from the base point of 54% to a final 
bound tariff of 37.9%. Instead, during its WTO Accession 
negotiations, China made greater concessions on reduction of 
agricultural tariffs. Pursuant to China‘s commitments, the 
agricultural tariff fell in 2002 to 18.5%, in 2004 to 15.6%, and by 
the year 2008 it will be further reduced to 15.1%. Such 
reductions would amount to an overall tariff reduction rate by 
67.1%, which far exceeds the concession made by other members 
(36% for the developed Members, and 24% for the developing 
                                                        
21 China‘s dubious honor of being the WTO Member with the longest accession process has been 
overtaken by Russia, which is in its 17th year of accession negotiation as of 2010. 
22 Miaomiao Shi, China’s Participation in the Doha Negotiations and Implementation of its 
Accession Commitments, in CHINA‘S PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO 23, 28-29 (Henry Gao & Donald 
Lewis eds., 2005).  
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Members). Even if the new Doha Round concludes with a 
reduction rate on agricultural products of as high as 48%, the 
total tariff cut of China would still exceed the total tariff cut of 
other countries during the Uruguay and Doha Round combined. 
Independent experts affirm this view. For example, Mattoo notes that 
China‘s services commitments are generally higher than other WTO 
Members in terms of both the width of coverage and the depth of 
market-opening. Indeed, he praises China‘s commitments under the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) as ―the most radical 
services reform program negotiated in the WTO.‖
23
 This observation is 
shared by Lardy, who noted in his study of China accession package that 
China‘s commitments ―far surpass those made by founding members of the 
WTO and, in some cases, go beyond those made by countries that have 
joined the organization since its founding in 1995.‖
24
 
Because of its substantial accession commitments, China has been 
arguing that it, along with other ―Recently Acceded Members (RAMs)‖, 
should not be required to make the same level of concessions as the 
founding WTO Members.
25
 As the flip side of this strategy, China also 
tries to refrain from making aggressive demands in the negotiation and 
keeps a low profile in general to avoid unwanted attention from the other 
players.  
To be fair, many WTO Members were initially sympathetic to the call 
for special treatments for RAMs. For this reason, the Hong Kong 
Ministerial Declaration explicitly states that ―[w]e recognize the special 
situation of recently-acceded Members who have undertaken extensive 
market access commitments at the time of accession. This situation will be 
taken into account in the negotiations.‖
26
 Indeed, had the DDA been 
concluded according to the original schedule, it is not unlikely that China 
could have avoided making substantial concessions on agriculture or 
NAMA by hiding under the ―RAM‖ label. Unfortunately, however, as the 
Doha Round drags on, fewer Members are willing to give a ―free ride‖ to 
Members such as China that acceded a decade ago. Moreover, the U.S. and 
EU face increasing pressures: on the one hand, their negotiating partners 
ask them to make more concessions; one the other hand, vocal domestic 
constituencies (such as labor and farmer groups) have been calling for the 
government to seek more inroads into foreign markets while avoid having 
                                                        
23 Aaditya Mattoo, China’s Accession to the WTO: The Services Dimension, 6(2) J. INT‘L. ECON. L. 
299, 300 (2003). 
24 LARDY, supra note 12, at 104-05. 
25 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Conference, 5th Sess., Cancún, Statement by H.E. Mr. Lu 
Fuyuan, Minister of Commerce of China, at 2, WT/MIN(03)/ST/12 (Sept. 10-14, 2003). 
26  World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 18 December 2005, at 11, 
WT/MIN(05)/DEC (2005). 
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to provide access to their own domestic markets. Thus, they need to find 
another scapegoat to divert part of the attention. What could be a better 
target than China—the economic superpower on rapid rise? Thus, starting 
from 2006, the U.S. and EU have been pushing China from both sides: For 
example, the U.S. has repeatedly urged China, as the biggest beneficiary of 
the multilateral trading system, to take more responsibilities at the WTO.
27
 
Similarly, the EU has argued that China should be required to make 
contributions just like other WTO Members.
28
 While the U.S. and EU use 
ambiguous terms such as ―leadership‖ to describe such ―responsibilities‖ 
and ―contributions‖, a careful reading between the lines of their messages 
reveals that what the U.S. and EU have in mind is really asking China to 
provide more concessions in key areas such as agriculture, NAMA and 
services so that they can have a better report card to show to their domestic 
stakeholders. 
While China fought hard to avoid making new concessions by being 
recognized as a RAM, it seems that China has lost the battle. According to 
the latest negotiating drafts, the prevailing consensus seems to be that 
flexibility will be extended mostly to small, low-income RAMs and ―very 
recently acceded Members‖, i.e., those that acceded to the WTO after the 
Doha Round was launched. 
B. Lack of Expertise 
Even if China wishes to participate more fully in the WTO, as a new 
Member, China lacks familiarity with the rules of game and cannot 
participate effectively. This is the case for both substantive WTO rules as 
well as for procedural rules. 
Regarding the substantive rules, while most important of them have 
been compiled in the Secretariat publication, The Legal Texts: The Results 
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
29
 there are also 
numerous GATT protocols, decisions, and other legal instruments that are 
not available in a readily-accessible format.
30
 On top of those, as noted by 
the Appellate Body in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II,
31
 there are many 
                                                        
27 See, e.g., Susan Schwab, U.S. Trade Representative, Remarks at the 40th Anniversary Gala 
Dinner of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations (Oct. 12, 2006) (transcript available at 
http://www.ncuscr.org/files/2006Gala_SusanSchwab.pdf). 
28 See, e.g., Martin Khor, Trade: China and EU Clash over RAMs at NAMA Meeting, #6362 SUNS, 
Nov. 9, 2007, available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/wto.info/twninfo110719.htm (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
29 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF 
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (1999). 
30 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, art. 1(a)-(c), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1, Legal Instruments – Results of 
the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994]. 
31  Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, 
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panel reports adopted during the GATT era, which, as ―an important part of 
the GATT acquis . . . create legitimate expectations among WTO Members, 
and, therefore, should be taken into account where they are relevant to any 
dispute.‖
32
 In addition, in line with the tradition of ―constructive 
ambiguity‖, many WTO rules are drafted in such a way that they are 
difficult to interpret for any Member, let alone newer ones. This is 
especially the case for rules that provide for flexibilities, which are often 
too technical for developing countries to master, as Deere demonstrated in 
her excellent study on the use of flexibilities in the TRIPS agreement.
33
 
For new Members in particular, it is a major challenge to grasp these legal 
rules. 
Compared with the substantive rules, the procedural rules of the WTO 
are even more difficult for new Members to decipher. While Articles IX 
and X of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO (WTO 
Agreement) provide a set of elaborate rules for the voting requirements for 
various decisions, formal voting has been rare in the history of the GATT 
and WTO.
34
 In practice, most if not all decisions are made by ―consensus‖. 
But what is ―consensus‖? According to the footnote to Article IX(1) of the 
WTO Agreement, consensus is defined as the situation where ―no Member, 
present at the meeting when the decision is taken, formally objects to the 
proposed decision.‖ However, such cryptic explanation offers little help to 
the uninitiated. Ironically, that is probably the reason why the consensus 
rule is preferred over the clearly defined and easily understood rules, such 
as two-thirds or three-fourths majority. To make it even more hopeless, 
even the consensus rule itself is of little use in reality as it applies to 
decision-making in formal meetings, which unfortunately is not where 
most decisions are made at the WTO. As acknowledged by the WTO 
Secretariat, ―[i]mportant breakthroughs are rarely made in formal meetings 
of [WTO] bodies, least of all in the higher level councils. Since decisions 
are made by consensus, without voting, informal consultations within the 
WTO play a vital role in bringing a vastly diverse membership round to an 
agreement.‖
35
 Thus, the only way to acquire essential negotiating skills 
such as agenda-setting and coalition-building is through actual participation 
                                                                                                                          
WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996). 
32 Id. ¶ 18. 
33 See generally CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND 
THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2009). 
34 For a review of the problems with the GATT/WTO decision-making rules, see Claus-Dieter 
Ehlermann & Lothar Ehring, Are WTO Decision-Making Procedures Adequate for Making, 
Revising and Implementing Worldwide and 'Plurilateral' Rules?, in REFORMING THE WORLD 
TRADING SYSTEM LEGITIMACY, EFFICIENCY, AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 497-522 
(Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 2005). 
35 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, Whose WTO Is It Anyway?, in UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: 
THE ORGANIZATION 101, 104 (2008), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e 
/tif_e/ understanding_e.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
2011] ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM: CHALLENGES OF INTEGRATING 
CHINA INTO THE WTO SYSTEM 
 
 
147 
 
in the real work of the WTO. Unfortunately, as China did not join the WTO 
as a formal Member until six years after the WTO was formed, it faced a 
rather steep learning curve. In this regard, the 30 years of experience China 
had already acquired as a Member of the UN at the time it joined the WTO 
were not of much help either for two reasons. First, the nature of trade 
negotiations is very different from the political grand-standing at the UN. 
As one WTO official observed: ―The UN is a talk-shop; the WTO is for 
getting real business done.‖
36
 Second, at the UN, China has been a 
Member of its key decision-making body—the Security Council—from the 
very beginning. In contrast, there is no such formal institutional 
arrangement at the WTO. Also, the key players in the global trade arena 
have been rather reluctant to grant China a seat at the table of the informal 
negotiating groupings for fear of diluting their own power.
37
 While China 
has substantial trade volume, this by itself has not guaranteed China a 
position as a key player in WTO negotiations.  
C. The Mismatch between the China-specific Provisions and the 
Normal WTO Framework 
In addition to the extensive market access commitments in both goods 
and services, China also reluctantly accepted many discriminatory clauses 
that are tailor-made for itself as part of its accession agreement. By their 
nature, these China-specific provisions are beyond the normal WTO 
framework. Thus, even if China acquired expertise in normal WTO 
negotiations, this would not solve the main problems facing China.  
These provisions can be further divided into two categories: WTO-plus 
obligations, i.e., obligations that are beyond those normally required of 
WTO Members; and WTO-minus rights, i.e., rights that are less than those 
usually enjoyed by WTO Members.  
The WTO-plus obligations include for example:
38
 
1. The obligation to translate all foreign trade laws into one of the official 
languages of the WTO, while the normal transparency obligation in the 
WTO agreements only requires Members to publish trade laws and 
regulations in their own national languages.
39
 
2. A special transitional review mechanism. Under this mechanism, 
China‘s trade policy shall be reviewed annually by the WTO since its 
                                                        
36 The author‘s interview with a senior WTO diplomat (anonymous). 
37 As I will note below, due to China‘s unique position as both a developing country and a major 
trader, neither the developed countries nor the major developing countries regard China as one of 
their own and both view China more as a threat rather than a potential ally. 
38  For a detailed discussion of the WTO-plus obligations, see Julia Ya Qin, “WTO-Plus” 
Obligations and Their Implications for the World Trade Organization Legal System: An Appraisal 
of the China Accession Protocol, 37(3) J. WORLD TRADE 483, 491 (2003). 
39 See, e.g., GATT 1994, supra note 30, art. X. 
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accession. There will be a total of nine such reviews, with the first to 
the eighth of such reviews conducted every year after 2001 and a final 
review no later than the tenth anniversary after China‘s accession. This 
obligation is in addition to the normal periodic review as mandated by 
the Agreement on Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM), under 
which China would only need to be reviewed once every four years at 
the time of its accession.
40
 
3. The obligation to provide national treatment to both foreign products 
and persons, while the WTO national treatment clauses only cover 
measures applicable to products. 
As to the WTO-minus rights, they include the following:
41
 
1. Designation of China as a ―non-market economy‖ in anti-dumping 
investigations for the first 15 years after its accession, which makes it 
easier for investigating authorities to find the existence of dumping; 
2. The inclusion of an ―alternative benchmark‖ methodology in subsidy 
and countervailing measures (SCM) investigations, which also creates 
biases in favor of a positive finding on subsidies, all other things being 
equal; 
3. A special textile safeguard mechanism (until end of 2008), and a 
transitional product-specific safeguard mechanism (until end of 2013). 
Both safeguard mechanisms substantially lowered the substantive and 
procedural safeguards in GATT Article XIX and the Safeguards 
Agreement, making it much easier for other countries to invoke 
safeguard measures against China while at the same time more difficult 
for China to challenge such measures. 
As these provisions were specifically designed to soften the impact of 
China‘s WTO accession on other Members, they have a much more direct 
impact on Chinese exports than general WTO rules applicable to other 
members, at least during the transitional period. While the exact 
relationship between China‘s special provisions and the normal WTO rules 
is still subject to debate,
42
 most commentators would agree that the 
China-specific provisions would take precedence pursuant to the principle 
of lex specialis derogat legi generali (a special rule prevails over a general 
rule). Thus, at least until 2017, i.e., before the expiration of these 
China-specific provisions, China would regard the revision of these special 
                                                        
40 Trade Policy Review Mechanism, Sec. C, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 3, Legal Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 
1125 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/29-tprm.pdf (last visited Feb. 
27, 2011). The frequency of review is determined according to the trade share of the Member under 
review. At the time of its accession, China was the sixth largest trader in the world. With its 
growing trade share, China is now reviewed on a biennial basis. 
41  For a detailed discussion of the WTO-minus rights, see generally Henry Gao, China’s 
Participation in the WTO: A Lawyer’s Perspective, 11 SING. Y.B. INT‘L L. 1 (2007). 
42 For the legal problems raised by these provisions, see id. at 15-17. 
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provisions rather than the revision of the general WTO rules as a more 
urgent task. Unfortunately, revising the China-specific accession provisions 
through the WTO negotiations will be extremely hard, if not impossible. To 
start with, the WTO is ill-equipped for this task. Among the WTO 
Agreements, none contain explicit rules on how to revise the accession 
protocol. In practice, other than a few isolated cases of minor revisions of 
accession commitments,
43
 there has been no precedent of comprehensive 
revisions of accession terms for particular countries. Thus, if China were to 
insist on revising its accession provisions, the default consensus rule would 
probably apply. As we have seen from the history of the WTO, consensus 
among all WTO members is extremely hard to come by—indeed, it is one 
of the reasons why the Doha Round is taking so long. More importantly, 
most other WTO Members are not interested in the idea of revising China‘s 
terms of accessions. Furthermore, even if assuming, arguendo, that China 
could somehow persuade other Members to accept its request to revise its 
accession commitments, it probably will have to provide compensation to 
other Members as per the current rules on the renegotiation and 
modification of schedules.
44
 Such compensation will have to take the form 
of additional concessions to other Members beyond the commitments 
China made upon accession. However, as I explained earlier, it is very 
unlikely that China will be willing to provide such additional concessions. 
As I will discuss below, this factor also partly explains why China chose to 
take a relatively high-profile in WTO disputes and RTA negotiations. 
Against this context, the recent calls by the U.S. and EU for China to 
shoulder more responsibility and make more concessions in the Doha 
Round are rather ironic: on the one hand, the U.S. and EU imposed harsh 
conditions on China in the accession negotiations and effectively denied 
China the normal membership status;
45
 on the other hand, the U.S. and EU 
                                                        
43 For example, when Mongolia acceded to the WTO in 1997, it committed to phase out and 
eliminate its export duty on raw cashmere within ten years. Due to both economic and 
environmental concerns, however, Mongolia found it unable to eliminate the export duty. It 
requested the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG) for a five-year waiver on its accession 
commitment on cashmere, which was approved by the CTG on 9 July 2007. WTO, Goods Council 
approves waivers for Mongolia, US, WTO: NEWS ITEMS, July 9, 2007, http://www.wto.org/ 
english/news_e/news07_e/good_counc_9july07_e.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). The background 
of this case can be found in Damedin Tsogtbaatar, Mongolia’s WTO Accession: Expectations and 
Realities of WTO Membership, in MANAGING THE CHALLENGES OF WTO PARTICIPATION: 45 CASE 
STUDIES 409-419 (Peter Gallagher et al. eds., 2005). 
44 See, e.g., GATT 1994, supra note 30, art. XXVIII; General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. 
XXI, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1, 
Legal Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).  
45 As noted by Cattaneo and Braga in their comprehensive study on WTO accessions, while many 
other WTO Members which acceded to the WTO recently were also asked to assume obligations 
beyond the normal WTO disciplines, none of them are as onerous as those imposed on China, 
which remain a ―particularly challenging and atypical case.‖ See generally Olivier Cattaneo & 
Carols A. Primo Braga, Everything You Always Wanted to Know about WTO Accession (But Were 
Afraid to Ask) (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper Series 5116, 2009). 
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now want China to behave like a ―normal‖ WTO Member, or even to go 
beyond what normal WTO Members would offer by taking up the 
―leadership responsibility‖. Before the U.S. and EU abandon such 
double-standards and instead treat China on a non-discriminatory basis, 
why should China be expected to contribute to the Round above and 
beyond what is expected of a normal Member?  
Moreover, as eloquently explained by Sun Zhenyu, China‘s former 
Ambassador to the WTO, China has already made more contributions to 
the Round than even major developed countries. According to Sun‘s 
statement at the Informal Trade Negotiations Committee Meeting held on 
August 11, 2008, which is a kind of post-mortem session after the failure of 
the Members to reach major breakthrough during the previous week: 
We have tried very hard to contribute to the success of the 
round. It is a little bit surprised that at this time the U.S. started 
this finger pointing. I am surprised because they are now talking 
about cotton, sugar, rice of China as seems that we are not going 
to make any efforts in the Round. Let me explain what China has 
contributed in the round. 
Because of our accession negotiations, our tariff in 
agriculture on average is 15.2% and now bound at this level, 
which is lower than the average of European Union, lower than 
Canada, lower than Japan, lower than quite a number of other 
developed countries on average. But on that basis, we are 
committed in this round to cut further down our tariffs, the 
applied tariffs deeply. And in NAMA, our average is 9%, bound 
at that level. And in this round, we will cut about 30% in applied 
level. So we are making contributions of 50% of the total 
developing countries in terms of applied rate cut. 
. . . . 
If you consider what the contributions that developed 
countries are going to make, in OTDS (Overall Trade-Distorting 
Domestic Support) the U.S. is spending $7 to 8 billion this year 
or last year, maybe a little bit more to $10 billion, but they are 
offering $14.5 billion with a lot of policy space for themselves. 
And in their tariff cut in agriculture, they are protecting their 
sensitivities through sensitive products while they are saying 
―well even if we have sensitive products for 5 or 4% of our tariff 
lines, we will have TRQ (Tariff Rate Quota) expansions‖. But 
they can never expand their TRQ to the level of China's TRQ 
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quantities. In our case, our TRQ is 9 million tons for wheat, 7 
million tons for corn, 5 million tons for rice. How about your 
quota, even after the expansion they will never pass half a million 
tons. Where is the new market access to the developed 
countries?
46
  
In summary, because of these discriminatory clauses, China has put 
more efforts into softening the adverse effects of these provisions at the 
expense of more active participation in the Doha Round. If the major 
Powers in the WTO are really sincere in their calls for more responsibility 
by China in the DDA, they shall also not grudge at the thought of granting 
China a seat at the big-players table, which can only start with removing 
the discriminatory treatment and restoring China‘s legitimate rights as a 
normal WTO Member. 
D. Awkward Position on Other Issues 
Among the diversity of WTO Members, China is notable for not only 
the size of its economy but also its multi-faceted interests. This in turn 
results in different or even conflicting demands in the formulation of its 
trade policy. Here are two examples of such conflicts. 
The first is the conflict between China‘s self-designated political 
position as a developing country and its economic standing as a major 
trader. For political reasons, China has always labeled itself as a developing 
country and joined several major developing country groups in the WTO, 
such as the G-20
47
. On the other hand, however, the fact remains that China 
is one of the most important traders in the world along with the major 
developed countries such as the U.S., EU and Japan. Thus, on many issues, 
China‘s true interests actually lie closer to those of developed countries 
rather than those of developing countries. Take agriculture for example. 
One of the major demands of developing countries is the elimination of 
export subsidies and reduction of domestic support. As one of the largest 
importers of many agricultural commodities such as wheat, cotton, and 
soybeans, however, China would probably find itself becoming the primary 
victim of the hike in world commodity price that would accompany the end 
                                                        
46 Sun Zhenyu, H.E. Ambassador, permanent Mission P.R.C. to the WTO, Statement at the 
Informal Trade Negotiations Committee Meeting (Aug. 11, 2008), available at http://wto2.mof 
com.gov.cn/aarticle/inbrief/200808/20080805717988.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
47 The G-20 is the coalition of developing countries pressing for ambitious reforms of agriculture 
in developed countries with some flexibility for developing countries (not to be confused with the 
G-20 group of finance ministers and central bank governors, and its recent summit meetings). It 
currently has 23 members, i.e., Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, 
Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Uruguay, Zimbabwe. See WTO, http://www. 
wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negoti_groups_e.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
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of subsidies by developed countries. In the area of NAMA, major 
developed countries have been pressing developing countries to reduce 
tariffs. As the ―factory of the world‖, China stands to gain tremendously 
from the reduction of industrial tariffs. However, China finds it politically 
difficult to request that developing countries lower their tariffs on industrial 
goods. Another example is trade facilitation. While many developing 
countries argued against inclusion of this issue in the Doha negotiating 
agenda—particularly early in the Round, China‘s position as one of the top 
exporters in the world gives it a strong interest in pushing the inclusion of 
trade facilitation in the WTO framework to make the customs process more 
efficient and cheaper. On all of these issues, due to the difference between 
China‘s political position and economic interests, it would be politically 
awkward for China to openly deviate from the developing country 
―party-line‖. Thus, the best strategy seems to be to keep a low profile. 
The second conflict is in the area of the WTO‘s rules related to trade 
remedies, where China is both the biggest victim and a major user. Take 
anti-dumping measures for example. China has been the favorite target of 
anti-dumping investigations and actions for many years. According to a 
study by Bown, from 1995 to 2008, China was subject to 295 new 
anti-dumping measures, which is twice of measures against the 
second-frequent anti-dumping target—Korea.
48
 Bearing in mind that 
Bown‘s figure for China only starts from China‘s WTO accession while the 
numbers for other countries date back to 1995, the contrast is even starker. 
Thus, one would think that China has an incentive to push for stricter 
disciplines on the use of anti-dumping in the Doha Round negotiations. At 
the same time, however, as one of the major users of anti-dumping actions 
in recent years, it also seems to make sense for China to argue that more 
discretion be given to the investigating authorities. Two other factors 
further complicate the picture. First, as noted by Messerlin, China is 
targeted more by developing countries than developed countries, especially 
if the number of anti-dumping actions is adjusted for trade size. For 
example, let‘s say that the EU imposes one anti-dumping measure against a 
certain dollar amount of imports from China, then according to Messerlin‘s 
study, India will adopt 10 anti-dumping measures while Mexico will adopt 
60 such measures for the same amount of imports.
49
 However, for fears of 
endangering the solidarity among developing countries and undermining 
the support to China by other developing countries on key political issues 
such as the Taiwan problem, at least in the eyes of the Chinese leadership, 
                                                        
48 See CHAD P. BOWN, SELF-ENFORCING TRADE: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND WTO DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT 82 (2009).  
49 Patrick A. Messerlin, China in the WTO: Antidumping and Safeguards, in CHINA AND THE WTO: 
ACCESSION, POLICY REFORM, AND POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGIES 29, 32 (Deepak Bhattasali et 
al. eds., 2004).  
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it would not be such a good idea for China to openly confront developing 
countries. Second, because China is not treated as a market economy in 
anti-dumping investigations, it does not matter much if the general rules 
under the Anti-dumping Agreement are improved or not, unless, of course, 
China argues for the clarification of the rules on the treatment of 
non-market economies in the Anti-dumping Agreement. Acquiring the 
latter clarification would be a difficult task for two reasons: first, as very 
few countries are in the non-market economy club, most WTO Members 
would not be sympathetic to China‘s request; second, even if the relevant 
rules in the main Anti-dumping Agreement were revised, it is unclear 
whether or not China would ultimately benefit from this as the 
China-specific ―non-market economy‖ provision is regulated by the 
Accession Protocol, which legally speaking is an entirely different 
agreement from the Anti-dumping Agreement. 
As the discussions in the three sub-sections above have illustrated, 
China‘s decision to keep a low profile in the current Round actually makes 
great sense. Unless there are substantial changes in the factors discussed 
above, it is unlikely that China will voluntarily assume a leading role in the 
talks. 
III. MULTILATERAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
In contrast to its reticence in WTO negotiations, China has transformed 
itself from being a reluctant player into an aggressive litigant in WTO 
dispute settlement activities. Its roles have shifted through three stages, 
outlined below. 
A. Rule-taker 
From the time of its accession to early 2006, China took on a cautious 
approach towards WTO litigation. As a newcomer unfamiliar with the 
WTO legal rules, China put more emphasis on learning WTO rules than on 
winning specific disputes. In an effort to discourage litigation, China 
usually settled disputes quickly with the complainant once a case was filed 
or threatened, even if it might have had good arguments to defend its 
actions.
50
 For example, in a matter concerning value-added tax rebates on 
integrated circuits, the U.S. made a request for consultations in March 2004, 
and the dispute was settled just four months later. The same period also saw 
China caving in only two months after the EC threatened to bring a formal 
WTO complaint against China‘s export quota regime on coke, an essential 
                                                        
50 For a review of China‘s approach towards WTO dispute settlement in this period, see Henry Gao, 
Aggressive Legalism: The East Asian Experience and Lessons for China, in CHINA‘S 
PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO, supra note 22, 315. 
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raw material for the production of steel. The climax of this approach was 
reached in the Kraft Linerboard case, in which the U.S. complained of 
inconsistencies with the Anti-dumping Agreement when MOFCOM 
imposed anti-dumping duties on U.S. Kraft Linerboard imports in 
September 2005. On Friday, 6 January 2006, the U.S. finally threatened 
with a formal WTO complaint. On the next working day—i.e., Monday, 9 
January 2006—the Chinese government made an announcement to scrap 
the anti-dumping duties in this case. 
B. Rule-shaker51 
To build a better understanding of the dispute settlement process, China 
started to actively participate as a third party in real WTO cases two years 
after its accession. From August 2003 to 2006, for example, China joined 
almost every panel established during the period as a third party. Through 
its participation as a third party, China gained invaluable understanding of 
the WTO dispute settlement system and boosted its confidence in 
participating in the system as a main party. Such enhanced confidence was 
well illustrated by the remarks of former Minister Bo Xilai of MOFCOM in 
May 2005. When asked whether China would bring complaints in the WTO 
against the countries that imposed restrictions against Chinese textile 
exports, Minister Bo Xilai responded: 
First, China has the right to resort to WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism. We should not hesitate to use this right when needed. 
Second, while bilateral consultation has its own benefits, if each 
side sticks to its own view, the problem won‘t be solved as there 
is no neutral arbiter. Thus, in addition to one-to-one consultations, 
sometimes it‘s more effective to have the disputes reviewed in the 
multilateral setting. Third, the restrictions against Chinese 
products are inconsistent with WTO rules and discriminatory. We 
strongly oppose such measures. Of course, it‘s up to us to decide 
whether to take any legal action against such measures and when 
to do so. 
Some of the thinkings that informed China‘s more-aggressive new 
strategy in WTO litigation are summarized in the following analysis of 
Mexico‘s litigation strategy in the Soft Drinks case
52
 by Dr. Ji Wenhua, an 
                                                        
51 For a review of China‘s shift in strategy, see generally Henry Gao, Taming the Dragon: China's 
Experience in the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 34(4) LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 
369 (2007).  
52 Panel Report, Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WT/DS308/R (Oct. 
7, 2005), as modified by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS308/AB/R (Mar. 6, 2006). 
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official in charge of dispute settlement activities at China‘s WTO Mission 
in Geneva. In the article he published in the July 2006 issues of the China 
WTO Tribune, Ji noted that Mexico fought an uphill battle in the case 
brought against it by the U.S., but made a good effort defending its case. 
According to Ji: 
In this case, Mexico‘s legal position was rather weak, but it 
has made an unrelenting effort by raising many arguments which 
are tenuous at best and fighting a losing battle. 
While we should not publicly praise such litigation strategy 
and attitude, this case still offers us some worthy lessons: under 
certain circumstances, we should try to employ some strategies, 
including resorting to sophistry and delay tactics. 
As a respondent, we should try to come up with as many 
factual and legal arguments as possible. Even if such arguments 
are mere sophistry, or made for purposes such as creating 
artificial difficulties for the panel, gaining sympathies, diverting 
the attention of other parties, or delaying the progress of the case, 
they are justified so long as they serve to protect our own 
interest.
53
 
Equipped with this enlightened new attitude towards the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism, China has taken a markedly different approach 
since then. The turning point came in March 2006, when the U.S., EU, and 
Canada brought a joint-complaint against China in the Auto Parts case.
54
 
The complainants accused China of violating WTO obligations by treating 
some imported automobile parts as whole-car imports and imposes 
additional charge equivalent to the difference between the higher tariff for 
whole-car imports and the lower tariff applicable to automobile parts. 
Legally speaking, this is a rather simple case as the illegality of the Chinese 
measure seems to be quite obvious, especially as China has made specific 
commitments to impose no more than 10% tariff on automobile parts 
imports in its accession package. However, rather than continuing the old 
practice of settling the disputes privately, China decided this time around 
not to concede defeat without a good fight. Over the next two and half 
years, the case would go all the way from the Panel to the Appellate Body 
until the Appellate Body finally issued its report in December 2008. 
                                                        
53 Emphases original, original in Chinese, translated by the author. 
54  Panel Reports, China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, WT/DS339/R, 
WT/DS340/R, WT/DS342/R, Add.1 and Add.2 (July 18, 2008), upheld and as modified by the 
Appellate Body Reports, WT/DS339/AB/R, WT/DS340/AB/R, WT/DS342/AB/R (Dec. 15, 2008). 
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The same aggressive approach was taken in several other cases, 
especially the TRIPS case
55
 and the Publications and Audiovisual Products 
case.
56
 In all these cases, China tried to shake or even bend the existing 
rules by aggressively making legal arguments that put its position in a 
better light. This strategy was reflected not only in the extensive 
substantive legal arguments China made, but also in its sophisticated use of 
procedural objections. As all good lawyers know, while procedural matters 
may seem mundane, they are of no less importance than substantive claims: 
if used well, they can even save a hopeless case. Judging from its 
performance in these cases, China has mastered the ―sophistries‖ very well. 
In the TRIPS case, for example, China attacked the complainants on such 
procedural grounds as the admissibility of certain evidence
57
 and the 
correct scope of the measures at issue.
58
 Similarly, in the Publications case, 
China‘s procedural arguments included the failure of the U.S. to establish a 
prima facie case,
59
 the evidentiary standards,
60
 and the appropriate scope 
of the Panel‘s terms of reference.
61
 
C. Rule-maker 
As observed above, while China accepted some rather harsh terms as 
the price for its WTO accession, it is likely to be difficult for China to 
change these terms through the multilateral negotiation process. This has 
left China with only one option: trying to challenge them and soften their 
negative impacts through creative interpretation in WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings. 
Among the five cases filed by China since September 2008, four (U.S. 
– Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties;
62
 EU – Steel Fasteners;
63
 U.S. 
– Tyres;
64
 and EU – Footwear
65
) were aimed at changing the rules, 
                                                        
55 Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights, WT/DS362/R (Mar. 20, 2009) [hereinafter Intellectual Property Panel Report]. 
56 Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain 
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/R and Corr.1 (Jan. 26, 2009) 
[hereinafter Audiovisual Products Panel Report], as modified by Appellate Body Report, 
WT/DS363/AB/R (Dec. 21, 2009). 
57 Intellectual Property Panel Report, supra note 55, ¶¶ 6.14-37. 
58 Id. ¶¶ 7.1-19.  
59 Audiovisual Products Panel Report, supra note 57, ¶¶ 7.458-460.  
60 Id. ¶¶ 7.620-632.  
61 Id. ¶ 7.63. 
62 Panel Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/R (Oct. 22, 2010). 
63 Panel Report, European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or 
Steel Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/R (Dec. 3, 2010). 
64 Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting Imports of Certain Passenger Vehicle and 
Light Truck Tyres from China, WT/DS399/R (Dec. 13, 2010). 
65 Request for the Establishment of the Panel, European Union – Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Certain Footwear from China, WT/DS405/2 (Apr. 9, 2010). 
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especially the provisions in China‘s Accession Protocol. For example, in 
the U.S. – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties case, China challenged 
the decision by the U.S. authorities to impose both anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties against several products imported from China. In 
addition to the usual claims under the GATT, the Anti-dumping Agreement, 
and the SCM Agreement, two claims made by China are particularly 
interesting, and are described in more detail below. 
The first claim is that the U.S. violated China‘s Accession Protocol by 
failing to follow the proper methodology for the determination of the 
existence and amount of subsidy benefits. Under Section 15(b) of China‘s 
Accession Protocol, in subsidy investigations, other WTO Members could 
―use methodologies for identifying and measuring the subsidy benefit 
which take into account the possibility that prevailing terms and conditions 
in China may not always be available as appropriate benchmarks‖. Similar 
to subparagraph (a) of the same Section, which allows other WTO 
Members to use surrogate prices in anti-dumping investigations against 
Chinese firms, this provision was introduced to address the concern that 
prices in China do not reflect the true cost as China is not yet a full market 
economy. However, unlike the non-market economy (NME) status in 
anti-dumping investigations, which is scheduled to expire 15 years after 
China‘s accession, the alternative benchmark methodology does not have 
an expiration date. Thus, theoretically speaking, the alternative benchmark 
methodology could be invoked even 100 years after China‘s accession to 
the WTO. As discussed above, it would have been very hard for China to 
try to change this provision in its accession terms through negotiations in 
the WTO. Instead, China decided to limit the applicability of the provision 
by giving teeth to some seemingly innocuous terms in the provision: first, 
China alleged that the U.S. failed to make a finding that there were ―special 
difficulties‖ in applying the prevailing terms and conditions in China as the 
basis for the determination of the existence of benefits; and second, China 
alleged that the U.S. failed to notify the SCM Committee of the 
methodologies it used. This is a very clever way to try to reduce the utility 
of the provision. It remains to be seen how the Panel would rule in this case 
as the Panel has not issued its report at the time of the completion of this 
article. However, if the Panel indeed chooses to give a strict interpretation 
of the term ―special difficulties‖, this might greatly reduce the 
attractiveness of the provision and even effectively render it void. 
The second claim is that the U.S. violated the relevant provisions in the 
Anti-dumping and Safeguards Agreements through its dual application of 
both anti-dumping and countervailing duties against the same products. 
While the same product may be subject to both anti-dumping and SCM 
investigations, in practice, the U.S. have always avoided the imposition of 
both anti-dumping and countervailing duties for the same product if they 
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are imported from market economies. However, non-market economies do 
not receive the same treatment and may be subject to both anti-dumping 
and countervailing duties. Under Article VI.5 of the GATT, WTO Members 
are prohibited from applying both anti-dumping and countervailing duties 
to the same products in the same case. However, the same provision also 
states that the prohibition of dual application only applies to cases of export 
subsidies and does not include actionable domestic subsidies, thus 
inapplicable to the alleged subsidies to Chinese products. On the other hand, 
one may also argue that to the extent that the dual application results in 
over-compensation, this might result in inconsistencies with the ―lesser 
duty rule‖ under both the AD and SCM Agreements. In summary, the rules 
as they currently stand are unclear. Therefore China hopes to clarify the 
rules or even make new rules through this case. As the expiration date for 
non-market economy status in anti-dumping investigations draws closer, 
subsidy investigations will become the main problem facing Chinese firms. 
Hopefully, through the clarification of these terms in dispute settlement 
activities, China will be able to change the rules in its favor so that its firms 
will have an easier time when this issue arises in the future. 
Similarly, both the tires safeguard case against the U.S. and the two 
anti-dumping cases against the EU involve claims of violation of the 
individual clauses authorizing the respective trade remedy measures in 
China‘s Accession Protocol. Given that the panel and Appellate Body have 
not been particularly fond of trade remedy measures, there is a good chance 
that the ambiguous terms used in the Accession Protocol be interpreted in a 
way that would restrict the utility of these provisions in the future. Should 
this be the case, China would have effectively changed the rules through 
WTO dispute settlement process. 
In summary, the past nine years have witnessed China adopting shifting 
strategies in WTO dispute settlement system: starting as a newcomer that 
largely passively ―took‖ obligations and commitments imposed upon it, 
China has transformed into a seasoned Member that skillfully ―shook‖ the 
existing rules to tilt in its favor, and now even a shrewd player that attempts 
to ―make‖ new rules reflecting its own interests by advancing strategic 
claims in dispute settlement. If the current trend continues, China will not 
only continue to be a heavy ―user‖ of the system, but also eventually 
become an ―owner‖ of the system. 
IV. REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
Strictly speaking, RTAs exist in their own universe parallel to the 
multilateral trading system. However, as they cover increasingly more 
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global trade,
66
 they have become an important component to global trade 
governance. Moreover, for most WTO Members, the WTO and RTAs are 
two alternative tracks that they will pursue at different times. Thus, in order 
to have a complete picture of China‘s position in global trade governance, I 
will also briefly discuss China‘s RTA approach here.  
While China is now an active player in WTO dispute settlement, it still 
took more than five years for it to initially ―warm up‖. In contrast, China 
did not waste any time in negotiating RTAs. Starting with the 
ASEAN-China FTA in 2002, China has been busy negotiating RTAs 
covering both trade in goods and services. The subsequent years witnessed 
the signing of the two Closer Economic Partnership Arrangements with 
Hong Kong, China (June 2003)
67
 and Macau, China (October 2003),
68
 
respectively; the FTAs with Chile (November 2005),
69
 Pakistan 
(November 2006), New Zealand (April 2008), Singapore (October 2008), 
Peru (April 2009), Costa Rica (April 2010); the launch of FTA negotiations 
with the Gulf Cooperation Council (April 2005),
70
 Australia (May 2005),
71
 
Iceland (April 2008),
72
 and Norway (September 2008);
73
 and with 
negotiations soon to begin with the South African Customs Union.
74
 
While political considerations seem to override economic benefits in 
many of these RTAs, China has also been trying to make new rules through 
them.
75
 These rule-making efforts cover both the structural aspects and the 
substantive rules of RTAs.  
                                                        
66 For example, according to Baldwin and Carpenter, more than half of world trade is conducted 
under the preferential tariff regimes under RTAs rather than the MFN regime under the WTO. See 
Theresa Charpenter, A Historical Perspective on Regionalism, in MULTILATERALIZING 
REGIONALISM: CHALLENGES FOR THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 13, 25 (Richard Baldwin & 
Patrick Low eds., 2009). 
67 Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement, P.R.C.-H.K., Dec. 27, 
2003, http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/legaltext/cepa_legaltext.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
68  Mainland and Macau Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement, P.R.C.-Mac., 2003, 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/chinmacaofta.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
69 Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the 
Government of the Republic of Chile, P.R.C.-Chile, Nov. 18, 2005, http://www. 
direcon.cl/documentos/China2/tlc_chile_china_ing_junio_2006.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
70 See Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China Department of International Trade 
and Economic Affairs, China Completed First Round of FTA Negotiations with Six Gulf States, 
http://gjs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/af/ak/200505/20050500088391.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
71Austl. Dep't Foreign Affairs & Trade, Australia-China FTA Negotiations, SUBSCRIBER UPDATE, 
May 26, 2005, http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/fta/050526_subscriber_update.html (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2011) 
72 China FTA Network, Free Trade Agreements under Negotiation: China-Iceland FTA, http://fta. 
mofcom.gov.cn/topic/eniceland.shtml (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
73 China FTA Network, Free Trade Agreements under Negotiation: China-Norway FTA, http://fta. 
mofcom.gov.cn/topic/ennorway.shtml (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
74China FTA Network, Free Trade Agreements under Negotiation: China-SACU FTA, http://fta. 
mofcom.gov.cn/topic/ensacu.shtml (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
75 For a detailed discussion of China‘s FTA strategy, see generally Henry Gao, The RTA Strategy of 
China: A Critical Visit, in CHALLENGES TO MULTILATERAL TRADE: THE IMPACT OF BILATERAL, 
PREFERENTIAL AND REGIONAL AGREEMENTS 53 (Ross Buckley et al. eds., 2008). 
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First, in terms of the structure, China‘s RTAs tend to have a narrower 
coverage than those used by other major players, such as the U.S., EU, or 
Japan. Normally, China would start with an agreement on trade in goods 
alone and would expand to services only after commitments on goods have 
been substantially implemented. Take the FTA with Pakistan, for example, 
while the liberalization of trade in goods dates back to the signing of 
agreement on the Early Harvest Program in April 2005, the agreement on 
trade in services was only signed in February 2009. Similarly, in the FTA 
with ASEAN, the agreement on trade in goods was signed in November 
2004, while the agreement on services was only signed in January 2007. A 
reverse example is the FTA negotiation with Australia, which has 
languished for years partly due to the fact that Australia insists on dealing 
with services liberalization first while China wishes to proceed with the 
usual ―goods and then services‖ order. With regard to the issues which are 
not traditionally trade-related, such as environment protection, competition 
policy, and labor standard, China has been reluctant to include them as part 
of the FTA package. Recently, however, China has shown some willingness 
to include these issues as part of the FTA package. Nonetheless, in line with 
its cautious approach, China has largely chosen not to include these issues 
in the main agreement of the FTA, but preferred to address them in 
stand-alone side agreements or MOUs. 
Second, with regard to the substantive rules, China has insisted on the 
recognition of its market economy status by potential RTA partners as a 
pre-condition for virtually every RTA that it has signed. As mentioned 
earlier, in its accession package, China has agreed to be treated as a 
non-market economy. This makes it easier for other countries to find the 
existence of dumping in anti-dumping investigations against China. Given 
the structural problems in the WTO decision-making process, it is difficult 
for China to change its non-market economy status in the multilateral 
trading system. The remaining option is for China to negotiate with each of 
its trade partners to recognize China‘s market economy status. Because 
China has much more bargaining power at the bilateral/regional level, this 
strategy seems to be working. As of the end of 2009, 79 economies have 
recognized the market economy status of China.
76
 As more and more 
economies recognize China‘s market economy status, there would be 
mounting pressures on those who still deem China as a non-market 
economy to accept China‘s market economy status as an established 
precedent. When enough WTO Members have recognized China‘s market 
economy status, the non-market economy status clause in the Accession 
Protocol will be effectively eliminated.  
                                                        
76 Online Interview of Zhou Xiaoyan, Director General of Bureau of Fair Trade, MOFCOM (Dec. 
31, 2009), http://gzly.mofcom.gov.cn/website/face/www_face_history.jsp?desc=&p_page=2 &sch 
e_no=1515 (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
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It‘s interesting to note that the launch of China‘s FTA initiative 
coincided with its accession to the WTO. In the view of the author, this at 
least partially reflects China‘s dissatisfaction with its perceived 
―second-class citizen‖ status in the WTO. As the author argues earlier in the 
paper, while China is unhappy with the discriminatory clauses, there is little 
chance that they could be modified within the WTO framework. In contrast, 
FTA negotiations provide China with an alternative slate to remove some of 
these provisions, make new rules, and even formulate new templates that 
might help change the landscape at the WTO. 
V.  CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
As we can see from the discussions above, China has gradually 
emerged on the central stage of the multilateral trading system, albeit at an 
uneven pace in different settings: in the DDA negotiation, China has so far 
kept a low public profile even though it has made some interesting 
submissions behind the scenes; in WTO dispute settlement, China has 
transformed from a country that shunned litigation at all cost to one that 
actively uses the system to defend its interests; in FTA negotiations, China 
has been one of the most active players in Asia since its accession to the 
WTO in 2001. 
Looking into the future, it is very likely that China will become an 
increasingly active player in global trade governance. At the same time, 
given its diverse interests, China‘s degree and style of engagement on 
different aspects of global trade governance will probably vary. 
First, in WTO negotiations, if the Doha Round ever concludes and a 
new round is launched, we will probably see a more active China at work. 
This will not only be the result of China‘s rising economic clout, but will 
also reflect China‘s growing prowess in international diplomacy. While no 
indicator can accurately quantify a country‘s negotiating prowess, the 
number of submissions made in the negotiations can serve as a useful 
proxy.
77
 China did not make any submission in the Doha Round until 20 
June 2002, when China made a proposal on fisheries subsidies.
78
 By 
February 2005, China has made more than ten submissions.
79
 The number 
further jumped to 67 in December 2007. By the time of the July 2008 
meeting, China had made more than 100 submissions concerning the Doha 
Round. Judging from the rapidly increasing number of submissions, China 
                                                        
77 Nordström , supra note 19, at 12. 
78 China Society for World Trade Organization Studies, Chung Kuo Ts`an Yü To Ha Hui Ho T`an  
P`an Ta Shih Chi [Major Milestones in China’s Participation in Doha Round Negotiations] (2009), 
http://cwto.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/c/200910/20091006574682.html?1126026260=872534836 (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2011).  
79 Guangsheng Shi, Working Together for a Better Future Based on Mutual Benefit, in CHINA‘S 
PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO, supra note 22, at 15, 21.  
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has been learning very fast. Moreover, China itself will be more willing to 
participate in new multilateral trade negotiations as by then most of its 
discriminatory accession provisions would already have expired. 
Second, in WTO dispute settlement, we should expect more cases 
involving China as either respondent or complainant. In part, this would 
simply continue established patterns in the WTO: over the history of the 
GATT/WTO, it is rare to find cases where the two largest Members—i.e., 
the U.S. and EC—are not involved in, in some capacity. It is only natural 
that we would find China, the next big trader, pursuing and/or receiving the 
same treatment. On the other hand, as some of the past cases illustrate— 
such as the audiovisual case, the subsidies case, and the ongoing debate on 
China‘s currency policy
80
—many of the China‘s trade disputes are not just 
the old-fashioned clash between the giants that we have seen in the case of 
disputes between the U.S. and the EU. Instead, they reflect the inherent 
tension between the economic and political systems of China and the 
fundamental principles of the WTO, which were designed by and for 
economies that operate in vastly different environments. Will China work 
to change the existing rules in its favor through the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism? This seems unlikely. As we have seen in our previous 
discussion, while China has been trying to change some of the rules, they 
are almost exclusively terms that it finds discriminatory against itself, 
rather than general WTO rules. 
Third, in the short to medium-term future, we will probably see 
China‘s RTA frenzy waning down for the following reasons. First, the 
non-market economy status clause in China‘s Accession Protocol will 
expire in 2016, leaving China with no need to reward countries with RTAs 
just for the sake of recognizing its market economy status. Second, if one 
looks around, it is evident that most countries that are willing to negotiate 
RTAs with China have already done so, making it harder to find new 
candidates. Third, as the recent protests against China in Malaysia and 
Indonesia
81
 have shown, there might be backlash against China when the 
RTA commitments kick in. The complicated political consequences of 
China‘s RTAs, whose full implications remain to be seen, will probably 
make China more cautious in pursuing future RTAs. 
As history has shown, no international institutions can survive for long 
                                                        
80 For the complicated issues raised by the currency dispute, see, for example, THE US-SINO 
CURRENCY DISPUTE: NEW INSIGHTS FROM ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND LAW, especially Section 5: 
Does the Crisis-era Renminbi Regime Violate WTO Rules? Is the Threat of WTO Litigation 
Credible? (Simon J. Evenett ed., 2010), available at http://www.voxeu.org/reports/currency 
_dispute.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
81 Yuli Tri Suwarni, Thousands Rally to Demand Delay of ASEAN-China FTA, JAKARTA POST, 
Jan.7, 2010, available at http://bilaterals.org/spip.php?article16567 (last visited Feb. 27, 2011); 
Malaysia Government will address concerns over surge in imports from China, NAM NEWS 
NETWORK, Feb. 12, 2010, http://bilaterals.org/spip.php?article16786 (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
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without the support of the key players. As the biggest emerging power in 
the world today, China deserves a seat at the big-boy‘s table. While the 
other major powers, such as the U.S., EC and India might feel uneasy, they 
have to realize that recognizing a larger role for China in global trade 
governance also suits their own interests and those of the multilateral 
trading system as a whole. While the WTO, unlike its sister institutions, 
does not have any formal ―high-table‖, it is an open secret that many key 
decisions are made in informal processes such as the green room which 
extends invitation only to the key players. If China were denied the chance 
to play the game that the major powers have been playing, it might well 
decide to make its own game. Of course, one might have doubts as to 
whether the ―golden straightjacket‖ of multilateral trade rules, initially 
made for the medium-sized average WTO Members, could constrain an 
XXXL-size country like China. But such concerns are probably 
unwarranted as China has largely been a system-maintainer in the WTO. In 
short, while China‘s ascent in global trade governance might raise some 
feelings of uneasiness, the best way to ease such concerns is greeting it 
with more mutual understanding and accommodation, rather than reacting 
with simple fear and suspicion. 
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